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Abstract
We consider a large population dynamic game in discrete time. The peculiarity of
the game is that players are characterized by time-evolving types, and so reasonably
their actions should not anticipate the future values of their types. When interactions
between players are of mean-field kind, we relate Nash equilibria for such games to
an asymptotic notion of dynamic Cournot-Nash equilibria. Inspired by the works
of Blanchet and Carlier [7] for the static situation, we interpret dynamic Cournot-
Nash equilibria in the light of causal optimal transport theory. Further specializing
to games of potential type, we establish existence, uniqueness and characterization
of equilibria. Moreover we develop, for the first time, a numerical scheme for causal
optimal transport, which is then leveraged in order to compute dynamic Cournot-Nash
equilibria. This is illustrated in a detailed case study of a congestion game.
1 Introduction
We consider a discrete-time dynamic game played by N agents and study its behaviour
as N goes to infinity. Agents take actions in time in order to minimize a cost function
that depends on the whole population of players in a mean-field fashion. Agents may
have different characteristics or preferences, which define their own “type” and may
change (progressively) in time. The types play a crucial role in the choice of an agent’s
dynamic actions, since the latter can only rely on the partial knowledge of types to
date. Let us illustrate this with an example.
Example 1.1. Agents represent different delivery services. Each of these must visit
a number of sites in a given order (for instance, supermarkets or costumers). The
decision of each agent is whether to take the quick or the slow road in between sites.
The mean-field character of the situation arises because of congestion on the roads,
which is caused by the population of agents. At each site an agent collects a parcel,
to be delivered to the next site. Parcels may be tagged as “express” or “normal”, and
there is a penalty for the slow delivery of an express parcel. The type of the agent is
the sequence of parcel tags. In the dynamic game we consider, an agent may solely
base her actions (ie. taking quick or slow road) on the observed sequence of parcel tags,
but is uninformed about the tags of future parcels. By contrast, in a static game, the
full sequence of parcel tags is available from the start of the game. In Section 5.1 we
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illustrate how this leads to a different behaviour of the agents when we compare the
dynamic and static games.
We study Nash equilibria for such dynamic games by considering an asymptotic
formulation of the problem (namely where we think of a contunuum of infinitely
small players), whose solutions we refer to as dynamic Cournot-Nash equilibria. The
relevance of this problem for the finite population game is justified by limiting results
that we prove under suitable assumptions; see Propositions 2.5 and 2.8.
The first main contribution of the present paper is an equivalent reformulation of
the asymptotic problem in terms of optimal transport. In doing so we are strongly
inspired by the work of Blanchet and Carlier [7] for static games. Crucially, in our
dynamic setting actions take place in time and cannot anticipate the evolution of
agents’ types. This imposes a constraint in the optimal transport setting, which is
known in the literature under the name of causality, c.f. [5].
Our second main contribution is to establish existence, and a characterization, of
dynamic Cournot-Nash equilibria for the prominent subclass of potential games. This
for example allows us to include congestion effects in the cost function. Games of
this type are particularly tractable since, as it is well-known, they can be recast as
variational problems. Specifically, the search for dynamic Cournot-Nash equilibria
boils down to solving optimization problems over causal couplings.
Finally, we provide an algorithm to compute optimal causal couplings, which is the
first numerical method for causal optimal transport and therefore a result of its own
interest. In the present context, this allows us to compute dynamic Cournot-Nash
equilibria, as well as cooperative equilibria and the Price of Anarchy in the asymp-
totic formulation. Thanks to our convergence results, this leads to the computation
of approximate equilibria for the N -player game. Given its generality, we expect the
algorithm to be used in other applications of causal optimal transport, e.g. in imple-
menting the discretization scheme proposed in [1] or in the machine learning context
currently under development in [3].
For illustration, we implement the aforementioned algorithm in a toy model, akin
to Example 1.1. This model is used to further highlight the difference between the
notions of dynamic and static Cournot-Nash equilibria.
1.1 Literature
The articles which are the closest to ours are the works by Blanchet and Carlier
[6, 7] where, building on the seminal contribution of Mas-Colell [20], a connection
between static Cournot-Nash equilibria and optimal transport is developed. From a
probabilistic perspective, large static anonymous games have been recently studied by
Lacker and Ramanan in [17], with an emphasis on large deviations and the asymptotic
behaviour of the Price of Anarchy. We also refer to this paper for a thorough review on
the (vast) game theoretic literature. The crucial difference between the above papers
and the present one is the dynamic nature of the game we consider here.
Mathematically, our formulation is closely related to mean field games (MFG) in
a discrete-time setting (see e.g. [13]). For this parallel, the different types of agents
considered in our setup correspond to different subpopulations of players in the MFG.
The theory of MFG started with the seminal works of Huang, Malhame´ and Caines
[14] and Lasry and Lions [18], and has since seen a burst in activity, as e.g. documented
in the recent monograph by Carmona and Delarue [8].
The theory of causal optimal transport, used to reformulate our asymptotic equi-
librium problem, has been developed in the works [19, 5]. This theory has been suc-
cessfully employed in various applications, e.g. in mathematical finance and stochastic
analysis [2, 1], in operations research [22, 23, 24], and in machine learning [3]. The
2
novel numerical method developed in the present article can therefore be used to
approach a variety of problems, including for example the value of information in
dynamic control problems [2], stability of superhedging and utility maximization [4],
and McKean-Vlasov optimization problems [1].
Numerics for a symmetrized version of causal optimal transport, the so-called
bicausal transport, have been developed by Pflug and Pichler in [22, 23, 24], who refer
to it as nested distance. The method used in those papers, that relies on a dynamic
programming principle, seems to be ill-suited for the causal transport problem (cf.
[26]). To the best of our knowledge the present paper provides the first numerical
method for causal optimal transport. For this, we leverage on the regularization
approach developed by Cuturi [9] in the classical optimal transport framework; see
also [21].
2 The N-player game and its associated Cournot-
Nash limit
Let X and Y be two Polish spaces equipped with their respective sigma-algebras,
and T ∈ N a fixed time horizon. We consider a population of N players indexed by
i ∈ {1, . . . , N}.
At every time t ∈ {1, · · · , T}, player i is characterized by its own type, which is
an element of X, and is denoted by xit. We write
x•t := (x
1
t , · · · , xNt )
for the vector collecting the types of the population of players at time t, and similarly
xi• := (x
i
1, · · · , xiT )
for the vector collecting the type-path of player i. Accordingly, XN×T is the space of
all possible type paths. We denote by X a typical element of XN×T , which we may
represent as either
X = (x•1, · · · , x•T ) or X = (x1•, . . . , xN• ),
as context will reveal. Finally, in situations where the number of players N is varying,
we will write xN,it , x
N,i
• , x
N,•
t , and X
N , to stress the dependence on N . Otherwise we
will drop the dependence on N for most of the objects yet to be introduced.
From the beginning of the game, type distributions are known for all players, and
we denote them by ηN,i ∈ P(XT ). We so define the associated product measure
ηN :=
⊗
i≤N
ηN,i ∈ P(XN×T ).
On the other hand, at time t the collection of players’ time-t types is publicly known:
We thus set
Ft := σ(x•s : s ≤ t).
We now describe the actions that the players are to decide. At every time t, each
agent i needs to choose an action from Y. This choice may only depend on the available
information at time t, and is therefore defined through an Ft-measurable function
yit : (XN×T ,Ft)→ Y.
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We define yi•, y
•
t , and Y , with the same conventions as before. We henceforth call
pure strategy an element
Y = (y•1 , · · · , y•T ) or Y = (y1•, . . . , yN• ).
We consider a cost function
F : XT × YT × P(YT )→ R. (2.1)
This captures the fact that each player faces a cost which depends on its own type
(eg. xi•) and action (eg. y
i
•(X)), and on the distribution of actions of all other players
(anonymous game). For simplicity, we assume throughout that F is measurable and
lower-bounded, so all integrals that we will considered are well-defined.
From the beginning of the game, the types distributions ηN,i, i ≤ N , are known,
thus each player needs to average over all possible evolutions of types. Therefore, for
every pure strategy Y , the cost faced by player i is
J i
(
yi•, {yk•}k 6=i
)
:=
∫
XN×T
F
(
xi•, y
i
•(X),
1
N−1
∑
k 6=i δyk• (X)
)
ηN (dX).
Definition 2.1 (Pure Nash). Strategy Y is a pure Nash equilibrium for the N -player
game if1
J i
(
yi•, {yk•}k 6=i
) ≤ J i (A, {yk•}k 6=i) , (2.2)
for all i ≤ N and all F-adapted Y-valued processes A.
As pure equilibria rarely exist, a typical approach is to consider randomized strate-
gies: the choice of action at time t depends on types only up to time t (“non-
anticipativity”), but there may be also other factors influencing the game (eg. in-
dependent randomization), thus F-adaptedness may fail: A measurable function Z :
XN×T → P(YN×T ) is called mixed strategy if, for all t ≤ T and all bounded Borel
functions f : YN×t → R, the map
XN×T 3 X 7→
∫
YN×T
f
(
{y•s}s≤t
)
Z(X)(dY )
is Ft-measurable.2 Note that this is equivalent to the conditional independence y•t ⊥
x•u given Ft, for all u > t, under the measure
M(dX, dY ) := Z(X)(dY )ηN (dX) ∈ P(YN×T × XN×T ). (2.3)
The cost faced by player i when following a mixed strategy Z is then given by
Li(Z) :=
∫
YN×T×XN×T
F
(
xi•, y
i
•,
1
N−1
∑
k 6=i δyk•
)
M(dX, dY ). (2.4)
In what follows we write Z(dY ) rather than Z(X)(dY ), if context is clear.
Definition 2.2 (Mixed Nash). A mixed strategy Z is called a mixed Nash equilibrium
for the N -player game if
Li(Z) ≤ Li(Z˜),
for all i ≤ N and all mixed strategies Z˜ satisfying:
f : Y(N−1)×T → R bounded measurable (2.5)
=⇒
∫
YN×T
f
({
yk•
}
k 6=i
)
Z(X)(dY )
ηN−as.
=
∫
YN×T
f
({
yk•
}
k 6=i
)
Z˜(X)(dY ).
1The r.h.s. corresponds to replacing the action yi• by A for player i, leaving all other players unmodified.
2In plain language: A mixed strategy assigns an ‘action distribution’ to each type-path X. The X-
dependence of such an ‘action distribution’ is assumed to be F-adapted.
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We note that Condition (2.5) can be rephrased as: If M and M˜ are associated
to Z and Z˜ as in (2.3), then the joint distribution of {X, {yk•}k 6=i} is the same under
either M or M˜ .
Finding or characterizing equilibria for the N -player game is an extremely hard
task, even when existence can be proved. Hence rather than directly studying (mixed)
Nash equilibria, we will formulate an alternative equilibrium problem for a “represen-
tative player”. Proposition 2.5 below shows that this provides a way to approximate
equilibria for large (but finite) systems of players. The following definition trans-
lates the non-anticipativity of mixed-strategies to the asymptotic framework where
essentially we deal with a continuum of identical players.
Definition 2.3. A probability measure pi ∈ P(XT × YT ) is called causal if
pi(dyt|x1, · · · , xT ) as.= pi(dyt|x1, · · · , xt), for all t = 1, . . . , T − 1. (2.6)
If pi has XT -marginal µ and YT -marginal ν, it is called a causal (Kantorovich) transport
from µ into ν. Furthermore, pi is called pure (or a Monge transport) if, for all t,
yt = gt(x1, · · · , xt) pi-a.s. for some measurable function gt.
Definition 2.4 (Cournot-Nash). Given η ∈ P(XT ), a causal transport pi ∈ P(XT ×
YT ) is called dynamic Cournot-Nash equilibrium for a type-η population if, denoting
by ν the YT -marginal of pi, it holds
pi ∈ argminpi
∫
XT×YT
F (x, y, ν) pi(dx, dy), (2.7)
where minimization is done over causal transports pi ∈ P(XT ×YT ) with XT -marginal
η.
Note that finding dynamic Cournot-Nash equilibria amounts to solving a fixed
point problem: for any measure ν ∈ P(YT ), we first need to solve the minimization
problem in (2.7) and then check whether the solution has YT -marginal ν.
We henceforth fix a compatible metric on Y, with which we define the sum-metric
DYT on YT . For p ≥ 1, we introduce the p-Wasserstein distance Wp on the set
Pp(YT ) ⊆ P(YT ) of measures which integrate DYT (·, z)p for some (and then all)
z ∈ YT :
Wp(µ, ν) = inf
{∫
YT×YT
DYT (y, z)
ppi(dy, dz) : pi ∈ P(YT × YT ) with marginals µ, ν
}1/p
.
We now proceed to present two results, Propositions 2.5 and 2.8, which together
justify the interpretation of dynamic Cournot-Nash equilibria as an asymptotic version
of dynamic Nash equilibria in finite games (Definition 2.2). For static games this was
already explored by Blanchet and Carlier [6], while in the continuous-time case this
runs very close to the work of Lacker [16] for mean field games.
Proposition 2.5. Assume that for some p ≥ 1 and C ≥ 0 we have
|F (x, y, µ)− F (x, y, ν)| ≤ CWp(µ, ν) ∀ x ∈ XT , y ∈ YT , µ, ν ∈ Pp(YT ).
Let pi be a dynamic Cournot-Nash equilibrium for a type-η population and such that
its Y-marginal ν belongs to Pp(YT ). For each N , consider the N -agent problem with
types ηN,i := η, i ≤ N . Then, for every  > 0, there is N ∈ N such that, for all
N ≥ N, the strategy
ZN (XN )(dY N ) :=
⊗
k≤N
pi(dyN,k• |(x1, . . . , xT ) = xN,k• )
5
is an N -player mixed -Nash equilibrium, in the sense that
LN,i(ZN ) ≤ LN,i(Z˜N ) + , (2.8)
for all i ≤ N and all N -player mixed strategies Z˜N such that (2.5) holds.
Remark 2.6. The assumption ηN,i = η, i ≤ N , in the above proposition can be
replaced by the weaker assumption that the sequence ηN :=
⊗
i≤N η
N,i, N ∈ N, is
η-chaotic: for all k and all ϕ1, · · · , ϕk : XT → R continuous and bounded,
lim
N→∞
∫ ∏
j≤k ϕj(X
N,j)ηN (dXN ) =
∏
j≤k
∫
ϕj(x)η(dx).
We decided to present the result in the simpler case stated in the proposition in order
to avoid technicalities and keep the proof shorter.
Remark 2.7. Note that, in the -Nash equilibrium proposed in Proposition 2.5, each
player i plays a strategy which is xN,i• -adapted. That is, even with full information
on the type-path evolution of the entire population at hand, there is an approximate
Nash equilibrium where players determine their strategies according only to their own
type path, and that can be constructed based on a Cournot-Nash equilibrium. In
MFG terms, such “myopic” strategies are called distributed. Note that ZN also forms
an approximate Nash equilibrium for any partial-information version of the game, as
long as player i can at least observe the evolution of its own type.
Proof of Proposition 2.5. Let Z˜N be a mixed strategy satisfying (2.5). To ease the
notation, we set νY
N,−i
:= 1N−1
∑
k 6=i δyN,k• for all Y
N ∈ YN×T , and write η⊗N (dXN )
for
⊗
k≤N η(dx
N,k
• ), and ν⊗∞ for the law of an iid sequence of ν-distributed random
variables. Clearly
LN,i(ZN ) =
∫
F
(
xN,i• , y
N,i
• , ν
Y N,−i
) ⊗
k≤N
pi(dxN,k• , dy
N,k
• ).
Note that the measure p˜i ∈ P(XT × YT ), defined as the (xN,i• , yN,i• )-marginal of the
measure Z˜N (XN )(dY N )η⊗N (dXN ), has XT -marginal η and satisfies (2.6). It follows
that LN,i(ZN )− LN,i(Z˜N ) is equal to∫ (
F
(
xN,i• , y
N,i
• , ν
Y N,−i
)
− F (xN,i• , yN,i• , ν)) ⊗
k≤N
pi(dxN,k• , dy
N,k
• )
−
∫ (
F
(
xN,i• , y
N,i
• , ν
Y N,−i
)
− F (xN,i• , yN,i• , ν)) Z˜N (XN )(dY N )η⊗N (dXN )
+
∫
YT×XT
F
(
xN,i• , y
N,i
• , ν
) (
pi(dxN,i• , dy
N,i
• )− p˜i(dxN,i• , dyN,i• )
)
.
But since then the last term is non-positive, by definition of Cournot-Nash, we derive
LN,i(ZN )− LN,i(Z˜N )
≤
∫
YN×T×XN×T
P
(
xN,i• , y
N,i
• , ν
Y N,−i , ν
) ⊗
k≤N
pi(dxN,k• , dy
N,k
• )
−
∫
YN×T×XN×T
P
(
xN,i• , y
N,i
• , ν
Y N,−i , ν
)
Z˜N (XN )(dY N ) η⊗N (dXN ),
(2.9)
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where P (x, y, ξ, ζ) := F (x, y, ξ)−F (x, y, ζ). Note that, by the assumption of Lipschitz
continuity of F , we have |P
(
xN,i• , y
N,i
• , νY
N,−i
, ν
)
| ≤ CWp(νY N,−i , ν), hence the r.h.s.
of (2.9) is dominated by
C
∫
YN×T×XN×T
Wp(νY N,−i , ν)
⊗
k≤N
pi(dxN,k• , dy
N,k
• )
+C
∫
YN×T×XN×T
Wp(νY N,−i , ν) Z˜N (XN )(dY N ) η⊗N (dXN )
= 2C
∫
YN×T×XN×T
Wp(νY N,−i , ν) ν⊗N (dY N ),
(2.10)
since Z˜ fulfils (2.5). On the other hand, for yN,k• iid ∼ ν, LLN implies the following
two convergences as N →∞ for any fixed i ≤ N :
RN (z, Y
N ) :=
∫
DYT (u, z)
pνY
N,−i
(du) =
1
N − 1
∑
k 6=i
DYT (y
N,k
• , z)
p →
∫
DYT (u, z)
pν(du)
ν⊗∞-a.s. and νY
N,−i
weakly converges to ν. These convergences in turn imply
Wp(νY N,−i , ν)→ 0 ν⊗∞-a.s.
Since
∫
RN (z, Y
N )ν⊗∞(dY N ) =
∫
DYT (u, z)
pν(du) for each N , also RN (z, Y
N ) →∫
DYT (u, z)
pν(du) in L1(ν⊗∞), and so the r.h.s. of
Wp(νY N,−i , ν) ≤
(∫
DYT (u, z)
pνY
N,−i
(du)
)1/p
+
(∫
DYT (u, z)
pν(du)
)1/p
is uniformly integrable, and thus also the l.h.s. is. This yields∫
Wp(νY N,−i , ν) ν⊗∞(dY N )→ 0.
Therefore, for every  > 0, there is N ∈ N such that, for all N ≥ N and all i ≤ N ,∫
YN×T×XN×T
Wp(νY N,−i , ν) ν⊗N (dY N ) ≤ /2C,
and the result follows from (2.10).
We now want to prove some kind of converse of Proposition 2.5, that is, to find
dynamic Cournot-Nash equilibria as limit of dynamic (-)Nash equilibria in N -player
games, when the size of the population tends to infinity. This is notoriously the
difficult implication, and indeed, in order to get such a result, we require a strong
assumption.
Proposition 2.8. Let ZN be a dynamic Nash equilibrium for the N -player problem
with types ηN , and set piN (dXN , dY N ) := ZN (XN )(dY N )ηN (dXN ) ∈ P(XN×T ×
YN×T ). Assume that the cost function F is continuous on XT × YT × Pp(YT ) and
bounded. For i ≤ N , define the (random) measures on YT :
νY
N,−i
:=
1
N − 1
∑
k 6=i
δyN,k• .
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Assume that, for N →∞, the sequence
PN :=
1
N
N∑
i=1
piN ◦
(
xN,i• , y
N,i
• , ν
Y N,−i
)−1
(2.11)
converges to P (dx, dy, dξ) ∈ P(XT × YT × P(YT )) in the sense that∫
L(x, y, ξ)PN (dx, dy, dξ)→
∫
L(x, y, ξ)P (dx, dy, dξ)
for all L bounded, measurable in the first argument and continuous in the last two
ones. Assume further that P ◦ ξ−1 = δν where ν := P ◦ y−1. Then pˆi := P ◦ (x, y)−1
is a Cournot-Nash equilibrium for a type-η population, where η := P ◦ x−1.
Remark 2.9. 1. An analogue version of this proposition still holds true if, instead of
Nash equilibria, the ZN are taken to be -Nash equilibria in the sense of (2.8).
2. Let pi be a Cournot-Nash equilibrium with Y-marginal ν, and {ZN}N∈N be the
corresponding -Nash equilibria for the N -player games constructed in Proposition 2.5.
Then the sequence in (2.11) converges to P (dx, dy, dξ) = pi(dx, dy)δν(dξ) in the desired
sense.
3. The strong assumption in this proposition is the degeneracy condition P ◦ ξ−1 =
δP◦y−1 . Without it, one would need to interpret the limit P as a weak Cournot-Nash
equilibrium, in the same spirit as [16]. Here we do not develop this weaker formulation.
Proof. We first show that the cost associated to pˆi is smaller than the cost associated
to any causal measure of pure type with XT -marginal η. Fix such a measure pi ∈
P(XT × YT ), with corresponding functions gt, t = 1, · · · , T as in Definition 2.3, and
set G(x) := (gt(x1, · · · , xt))Tt=1. Since ZN is Nash, for all i ≤ N we have
Li(ZN ) ≤ Li(ZN,i),
where ZN,i(XN )(dY N ) := ZN (XN )(dyN,k• , k 6= i)δG(xN,i• )(dy
N,i
• ). By summing up
over i and dividing by N , we get
1
N
∑
i≤N
∫
XN×T×YN×T
F
(
xN,i• , y
N,i
• , ν
Y N,−i
)
piN (dXN , dY N )
≤ 1
N
∑
i≤N
∫
XN×T×YN×T
F
(
xN,i• , G(x
N,i
• ), ν
Y N,−i
)
piN (dXN , dyN,k• , k 6= i).
(2.12)
Now, by convergence of the PN in (2.11), for N →∞ the l.h.s. in (2.12) converges to∫
XT×YT
F (x, y, ν) pˆi(dx, dy),
whereas the r.h.s. converges to∫
XT
F (x,G(x), ν) η(dx) =
∫
XT×YT
F (x, y, ν) pi(dx, dy).
Therefore ∫
XT×YT
F (x, y, ν) pˆi(dx, dy) ≤
∫
XT×YT
F (x, y, ν) pi(dx, dy) (2.13)
for every pure causal measures pi with XT -marginal η.
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To justify that pˆi is a Cournot-Nash equilibrium for a type-η population, it remains
to extend (2.13) to pi not necessarily pure. From the “chattering lemma” (see, e.g.,
[11, Theorem 2.2], [12, Theorem 4], [16, Lemma 6.5]), for any causal measure pi with
XT -marginal η, there are pure causal measures {pin}n∈N with the same XT -marginal
and such that pin → pi weakly. The proof then follows from (2.13), being F continuous
in x, y and bounded from above.
The above analysis, in particular Proposition 2.5 and Proposition 2.8, justify the
study of Cournot-Nash equilibria, which we do in Section 3 below.
3 Optimal transport perspective
In this section we study existence, uniqueness, and characterization of dynamic Cournot-
Nash equilibria by means of optimal transport techniques.
We start by recalling the general formulation of the classical optimal transport
problem: given two Polish measure spaces (X , η) and (Y, ν), and a cost function
c : X × Y → R, the optimal transport problem is defined as
inf
{∫
X×Y c(x, y) pi(dx, dy) : pi ∈ Π(η, ν)
}
,
where Π(η, ν) = {pi ∈ P(X × Y) with X -marginal η and Y-marginal ν} is the set of
all transports of η into ν. If X and Y are endowed with filtrations, say (FXt )t=1,··· ,T
and (FYt )t=1,··· ,T , we can also define the causal optimal transport (COT) problem
inf
{∫
X×Y c(x, y) pi(dx, dy) : pi ∈ ΠF
X ,FY
c (η, ν)
}
, (3.1)
where ΠF
X ,FY
c (η, ν) denotes the subset of measures in Π(η, ν) which are causal w.r.t.
FX ,FY , that is, such that ∀t and D ∈ FYt , the map X 3 x 7→ pi(y ∈ D|x) is
FXt -measurable.
From now on we will consider transports between the spaces X = XT and Y = YT ,
endowed with the respective canonical filtrations. In this way the above definition of
causality corresponds to the one we gave in Definition 2.3 above. In this setting we will
simply denote by Πc(η, ν) the set of causal transports of η into ν. Looking at (2.7), it
is clear that finding dynamic Cournot-Nash equilibria amounts to solving a generalized
version of a causal transport problem in which the second marginal is not fixed (while
the first marginal is the population type). In particular, a dynamic Cournot-Nash
equilibrium pi with marginals η and ν will also solve the COT problem in the sense of
(3.1), between the measures η and ν and with cost function c(x, y) = F (x, y, ν).
Remark 3.1. Finding Cournot-Nash equilibria for a type-η population amounts to
solving the following fixed point problem:
1. pi ∈ argminpi∈Πc(η,.)
∫
XT×YT F (x, y, ν̂) pi(dx, dy), for some ν̂ ∈ P(YT );
2. pi has second marginal ν̂,
where we used the notation Πc(η, .) = ∪ξ∈P(YT )Πc(η, ξ).
3.1 Potential Games
In this section we consider a separable cost, that is,
F (x, y, ν) = f(x, y) + V [ν](y). (3.2)
This means that we are considering the case where agents face an idiosyncratic part
of the cost, only depending on their own type and action, and a mean-field component
depending on other agents’ strategies; see the discussion after (2.1).
9
Example 3.2. Classical examples for the mean-field interaction term consist in pe-
nalizing (resp. encouraging) similar actions among players. For example (cf. [7]):
• repulsive effect (congestion): Vr[ν](y) = h
(
y, dνdm (y)
)
, where ν  m, m ∈ P(YT )
is a reference measure w.r.t. which congestion is measured, and h(y, .) is increas-
ing. This translates the fact that frequently played strategies are costly, and
leads to dispersion in the strategy distribution w.r.t. m.
• attractive effect : Y is a convex subset of an Euclidean space and we have
Va[ν](y) =
∫
Y φ(y, z)ν(dz), where φ is a symmetric convex function which is
minimal on the diagonal and increases with the distance from the diagonal.
This leads to concentration of strategies.
In this section we will consider a special class of games, so-called potential games,
where the mean-field functional V is the first variation of another function E , called
energy function.
Assumption 3.3. There exists a function E : P(YT ) → R such that the functional
V in (3.2) satisfies
lim
→0+
E(ν + (ξ − ν))− E(ν)

=
∫
YT
V [ν](y)(ξ − ν)(dy), ∀ ν, ξ ∈ P(YT ). (3.3)
We use the notation V = ∇νE .
For example, the repulsive and attractive functionals Vr, Va introduced above are
the first variation of the following functions, respectively:
Er(ν) =
∫
YT
H
(
y,
dν
dm
(y)
)
m(dy), Ea(ν) = 1
2
∫
YT×YT
φ(y, z)ν(dz)ν(dy), (3.4)
where H(y, u) =
∫ u
0
h(y, s)ds.3
Under Assumption 3.3, it is natural to consider the following variational problem
inf
ν∈P(YT )
{
COT(η, ν) + E [ν]}, (3.5)
where COT(η, ν) is the causal optimal transport of η into ν w.r.t. the cost function
f :
COT(η, ν) := inf
pi∈Πc(η,ν)
∫
XT×YT f(x, y) pi(dx, dy). (3.6)
We say that a pair (pi, ν) solves the variational problem (3.5) if pi solves the optimiza-
tion in (3.6), and its YT -marginal ν solves the one in (3.5). The following theorem
states the equivalence between Cournot-Nash equilibria and first order optimality of
problem (3.5).
Theorem 3.4. Let E be convex. Then the following are equivalent:
(i) pi is a dynamic Cournot-Nash equilibrium;
(ii) the pair made of pi and its YT -marginal solves the variational problem (3.5).
Convexity is for example satisfied by Er in (3.4) since h is increasing in the second
argument. Note however that the request of convexity can be weakened in Theo-
rem 3.4; see Remark 3.5.
3A further example of energy function is given by E(ν) = supa∈A
∫
YT l(a, y)ν(dy), where A is a concave,
compact subset of a topological space, and l : A × YT → R a measurable function strictly concave in the
first argument. In this case V [ν](y) = l(a∗(ν), y), where a∗(ν) is the unique optimizer for E(ν).
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Proof. (ii)⇒(i): let (pi, ν̂) solve (3.5), then, for any ν˜ ∈ P(YT ), COT(η, ν̂) + E [ν̂] ≤
COT(η, ν˜) + E [ν˜]. In particular, for any ν ∈ P(YT ) and  > 0,
E [ν̂]−E [(1−)ν̂+ν] ≤ COT(η, (1−)ν̂+ν)−COT(η, ν̂) ≤  (COT(η, ν)− COT(η, ν̂)) ,
by convexity of ν 7→ COT(η, ν). This implies
COT(η, ν̂)−COT(η, ν) ≤ lim→0+ 1
(E [(1− )ν̂+ ν]−E [ν̂]) = ∫YT V [ν̂](y)(ν− ν̂)(dy).
Therefore, for every pi ∈ Πc(η, ν),∫
XT×YT f(x, y) + V [ν̂](y) pi(dx, dy) ≤ COT(η, ν) +
∫
YT
V [ν̂](y)ν(dy)
≤
∫
XT×YT
f(x, y) + V [ν̂](y) pi(dx, dy).
Since ν was arbitrary in P(YT ), pi is a Cournot-Nash equilibrium by Remark 3.1.
(i)⇒(ii): let pi be a Cournot-Nash equilibrium, and ν̂ be its YT -marginal. From 1. in
Remark 3.1,
pi ∈ argminΠc(η,ν̂)
∫
XT×YT F (x, y, ν) pi(dx, dy) = argminΠc(η,ν̂)
∫
XT×YT f(x, y) pi(dx, dy),
that is, pi solves COT(η, ν̂); see also the discussion above Remark 3.1. We are then left
to prove that ν̂ solves the optimization in (3.5). By running backward the argument
used in the first part of the proof, and using convexity of E , we have that
COT(η, ν̂)− COT(η, ν) ≤ lim→0+ 1
(E [(1− )ν̂ + ν]− E [ν̂]) ≤ E [ν]− E [ν̂],
which concludes the proof.
Remark 3.5. 1. Convexity of E has been used only for the implication “(i)⇒ (ii)”.
In fact, we proved that E convex implies that V is LL-monotone, and that this in turn
ensures the implication “(i) ⇒ (ii)”. The notion of LL-monotonicity, introduced by
Lasry and Lions, can be written as∫
(V [ν]− V [ν′])(y)(ν(dy)− ν′(dy)) ≥ 0 ∀ν, ν′ ∈ P(YT ). (3.7)
2. Note that we do not have any restriction on the Polish space X, thus, already for
T = 1, Theorem 3.4 above generalizes Theorem 1 and Proposition 1 in [7], and our ar-
guments provides an easier proof that does not use Kantorovich duality and potentials.
The same is true for the existence and uniqueness results in [7]; see Corollaries 3.6
and 3.7 below.
3. Variational problems with similar structure to (3.5) appeared already in the work
[1] by the first two authors and Carmona, concerning a discretization scheme for (ex-
tended) mean-field control problems. Accordingly we may expect that the algorithms
in Section 4 below may be of relevance in that context too.
Corollary 3.6 (Uniqueness). If E is strictly convex, then all Cournot-Nash equilibria
have the same second marginal, that is, the distribution of the optimal strategies is
unique.
Proof. Assume E is strictly convex. Then, since ν 7→COT(η, ν) is convex, the varia-
tional problem (3.5) admits at most one solution ν. The statement then follows from
Theorem 3.4.
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Strict convexity is for example satisfied by Er in (3.4) when h is strictly increasing
in the second variable.
Corollary 3.7 (Existence). Assume f bounded from below and lower-semi-continuous,
and consider the mean-field functionals in Example 3.2. Cournot-Nash equilibria exist
under either:
1. V = Vr and h satisfy the growth condition: there is a coercive
4 differentiable func-
tion ` such that p(c+ `′(u)) ≤ h(y, u), for some p > 0, c ∈ R, and all u.
2. V = Va , φ ≥ 0 and continuous, and f(x, y) ≥ κ‖x−y‖p for some p ≥ 1 and κ > 0.
Proof. Since f is bounded from below and lower-semi-continuous, then COT(η, ν)
admits an optimal solution for any pair of marginals; this is a simple consequence
of Lemma 6.1. By the same lemma we derive that the function ν 7→ COT(η, ν) is
lower semicontinuous (and of course lower bounded). Indeed, if νn → ν∞ weakly, then
B :=
⋃
n∈N∪{∞}{νn} is weakly compact and so
⋃
ν∈B Πc(η, ν) is also weakly compact
by Lemma 6.1. If pin attains COT(η, νn), then (up to passing to a subsequence)
pin → pi for some pi ∈ Πc(η, ν∞), and thus lim inf COT(η, νn) ≥
∫
fdpi ≥ COT(η, ν∞).
We are then left to prove that the respective growth conditions ensure existence of
solutions to the minimization in (3.5), so that we can conclude by Theorem 3.4.
For Point 1, we first derive a+ bv + p`(v) ≤ H(y, v). For any optimizing sequence
{νn} for (3.5), we may assume that
∫
`
(
dνn
dm (y)
)
m(dy) ≤ C. By de la Valle´e-Poussin
theorem, the set of densities {dνn/dm}n is uniformly integrable and hence weakly
relatively compact in L1(m). If Z is any accumulation point in this set, then we
have νn → Zdm =: ν weakly. Since H(y, ·) is convex and continuous, Er is lower
semicontinuous. This shows, by the first paragraph, that ν is an optimizer of (3.5).
On the other hand, for Point 2, we first observe that
∫
fdpi ≥ c1 + c2
∫ ‖y‖pν(dy)
for each pi ∈ Πc(η, ν), for some constants c1, c2. As a result, if {νn} is a minimizing
sequence then
∫ ‖y‖pνn(dy) ≤ C for some large enough constant C. By Markov’s
inequality we obtain tightness of {νn}, and we may conclude as for Point 1 after
proving that Ea is weakly lower semicontinuous. To prove the latter, assume that
νn → ν∞ weakly. By Skorokhod representation, on some probability space there are
random variables {Wi : i ∈ N ∪ {∞}} such that Wn → W∞ a.s. and Wi ∼ νi for
each i ∈ N∪ {∞}. Possibly extending the probability space, we build an independent
family of random variables {W˜i : i ∈ N∪{∞}} with the same properties. We conclude
by Fatou’s lemma:
lim inf
n
∫
φ(x, y)νn(dx)νn(dy) = lim inf
n
E[φ(Wn, W˜n)] ≥ E[lim inf
n
φ(Wn, W˜n)]
≥ E[φ(W∞, W˜∞)] =
∫
φ(x, y)ν∞(dx)ν∞(dy).
3.2 Social planner and Price of Anarchy
From a social planner perspective, optimal strategies in an N -player game are those
that minimize the total cost, which corresponds to minimizing the average cost (this
latter form is the suitable one in order to study this problem asymptotically). In
this way we find the so called cooperative equilibria. The corresponding optimization
problem for N →∞ is the following:
inf
pi∈Πc(η,.)
∫
XT×YT
F (x, y, p2#pi) pi(dx, dy),
4Ie. lim|u|→∞ `(u)/|u| = +∞.
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where p2#pi denotes the second marginal of pi; to be compared with the asymptotic
formulation of the Nash (competitive) equilibria in Definition 2.4 or Remark 3.1. In
the separable case (3.2), this can be written as
inf
ν∈P(YT )
{
COT(η, ν) +
∫
YT
V [ν](y) ν(dy)
}
, (3.8)
to be compared with the variational problem (3.5) obtained in the competitive case.
With the same arguments used in Corollary 3.7, we can prove existence of solutions
for the asymptotic formulation of the cooperative problem.
Corollary 3.8. Assume f bounded from below and lower-semi-continuous, and con-
sider the mean-field functionals in Example 3.2. Solutions to (3.8) exist under either:
1. V = Vr and h satisfy the growth condition: there is a coercive function ` such that
p(c+ `(u)) ≤ h(y, u), for some p > 0, c ∈ R, and all u.
2. V = Va , φ ≥ 0 and continuous, and f(x, y) ≥ κ‖x−y‖p for some p ≥ 1 and κ > 0.
The Price of Anarchy is then defined as the ratio between the worst-case Nash
equilibrium total cost and the socially optimal total cost. Asymptotically,
PoA :=
supν∈N TC[ν]
infν∈P(YT ) TC[ν]
, (3.9)
where TC[ν] = COT(η, ν) +
∫
V [ν]dν is the total cost associated to the strategy
distribution ν, and N is the set of optimizers in the minimization problem in (3.5).
In Section 4, we will develop numerics to compute the Price of Anarchy, and we will
illustrate its behaviour with some example.
4 Numerical methods
In Section 4.1 we present a numerical scheme for the causal optimal transport problem.
The algorithm uses duality to transform the problem, and then applies the Sinkhorn
method to solve an essential part of it. Relying on it, we also develop a numerical
method for Cournot-Nash equilibria, in Section 4.2. The Python code implementing
these algorithms is freely available and can be found in https://github.com/JunchaoJia-
LSE/CNGonCOT. Numerical experiments show that the proposed methods are effi-
cient and stable.
4.1 A numerical method for causal optimal transport
We borrow the setting of Section 3.1. Thus COT(η, ν) denotes the causal optimal
transport problem of η into ν w.r.t. the cost function f , namely
COT(η, ν) = inf
pi∈Πc(η,ν)
∫
XT×YT f(x, y) pi(dx, dy).
We first recall a known result (see [5, Proposition 2.4] or [2, Lemma 5.4]). As a
matter of terminology, whenever {Ht}Tt=1 is a stochastic process defined on XT ×YT ,
we shall say that “H is x-adapted” if for each t the r.v. Ht is a function of x1, . . . , xt,
and define “H is y-adapted” in an analogue fashion. We use the notation Cb(W) for
the space of continuous bounded functions on the space W. Finally, we say that a
process {Ht}Tt=1 is continuous if each r.v. Ht(·) is a continuous function.
Proposition 4.1. For pi ∈ Π(η, ν), the following are equivalent:
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1. pi is causal (ie. pi ∈ Πc(η, ν));
2. For every bounded y-adapted continuous process {ht}Tt=1, and each bounded x-
adapted η-martingale {Mt}Tt=1,we have:∫
XT×YT
[∑
t<T
ht(y)(Mt+1(x)−Mt(x))
]
pi(dx, dy) = 0; (4.1)
3. For each t ∈ {1, . . . , T}, h ∈ Cb(Yt), and g ∈ Cb(XT ), the following vanishes∫
XT×YT
h(y)
[
g(x)−
∫
XT−t
g(x1, . . . , xt, x¯t+1, . . . , x¯T )η
x1,...,xt(dx¯t+1, . . . , dx¯T )
]
pi(dx, dy).
(4.2)
Definition 4.2. We denote by S the linear space spanned by the stochastic integrals
appearing in Equation (4.1), namely
S := span
{∑
t<T ht(Mt+1 −Mt) |M is a bounded x-adapted η-martingale,
h is bounded, y-adapted and continuous
}
.
Similarly, we introduce the set F equal to the linear span of the functions
h(y)
[
g(x)−
∫
XT−t
g(x1, . . . , xt, x¯t+1, . . . , x¯T )η
x1,...,xt(dx¯t+1, . . . , dx¯T )
]
,
as we vary t ≤ T, h ∈ Cb(Yt), g ∈ Cb(XT ).
Proposition 4.1 leads to existence and duality for COT(η, ν). Notice that, unlike
in [5, 2], we shall make no assumption on η whatsoever. Hence the next result needs
a proof, which we provide in the appendix.
Theorem 4.3. Assume that f is lower semicontinuous and bounded from below. Then
COT(η, ν) is attained and duality holds:
COT(η, ν) = sup
S∈S
inf
pi∈Π(η,ν)
∫
(f + S)dpi = sup
φ(x)+ψ(y)+S(x,y)≤f(x,y),
φ∈Cb(XT ),ψ∈Cb(YT ),S∈S
∫
XT
φdη +
∫
YT
ψdν
= sup
F∈F
inf
pi∈Π(η,ν)
∫
(f + F )dpi = sup
φ(x)+ψ(y)+F (x,y)≤f(x,y),
φ∈Cb(XT ),ψ∈Cb(YT ),F∈F
∫
XT
φdη +
∫
YT
ψdν.
Of all the above duality identities, we now solely exploit
COT(η, ν) = sup
S∈S
inf
pi∈Π(η,ν)
∫
(f + S)dpi. (4.3)
The driving idea is that infpi∈Π(η,ν)
∫
(f + S)dpi can be efficiently approximated using
Sinkhorn iterations. It is convenient to define
OTS(η, ν) := inf
pi∈Π(η,ν)
∫
(f + S) dpi. (4.4)
From now on, we specialize to a discrete setting. To be consistent with the notation
above, however, we keep the notation of integral w.r.t. pi.
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Assumption 4.4. The sets X and Y are finite, say |X| = n and |Y| = m.
For pi ∈ P(XT×YT ), we use the notation pii,j = pi(ix, jy), where {ix, i = 1, . . . , nT }
and {jy, j = 1, . . . ,mT } denote the elements in XT and YT , respectively. The entropy
of pi is then defined as
Ent(pi) = −
∑
i,k
pii,k log(pii,k).
Note that the entropy is uniformly bounded:
0 ≤ Ent(pi) ≤ C := |XT ||YT |e−1 = nTmT e−1. (4.5)
We now add an entropic penalization to the transport problem and consider, for
S ∈ S, the problem
OT,S(η, ν) := inf
pi∈Π(η,ν)
{∫
(f + S) dpi − Ent(pi)
}
. (4.6)
The penalization term makes the function inside the brackets strictly convex in pi,
which ensures existence of a unique optimizer in the weakly compact set Π(η, ν).
Theorem 4.5. We have
COT(η, ν) = lim
↘0
sup
S∈S
OT,S(η, ν),
and the convergence is monotonically increasing.
Proof. By (4.5), we have
inf
pi∈Πc(η,ν)
∫
f dpi − C ≤ inf
pi∈Πc(η,ν)
{∫
f dpi − Ent(pi)} ≤ inf
pi∈Πc(η,ν)
∫
f dpi, (4.7)
and we conclude by noticing that
inf
pi∈Πc(η,ν)
{∫
f dpi − Ent(pi)} = sup
S∈S
OT,S(η, ν),
as we justify in Lemma 6.2 in the appendix.
Note that, due to Assumption 4.4, the space S is generated by a finite basis,
say {ek}Kk=1 for some K ∈ N (see Appendix 6.2 for details). Then, by setting e :=
(e1, . . . , eK), and for  small enough, Theorem 4.5 suggests the following approximation
of the causal transport problem:
COT(η, ν) ≈ sup
λ∈RK
inf
pi∈Π(η,ν)
{∫
(f + λ · e) dpi − Ent(pi)
}
. (4.8)
Recalling the comment after (4.6), for any fixed λ the minimization problem in (4.8)
admits a unique optimizer, say pi∗(λ). This problem can be numerically solved in
an efficient way by implementing the powerful Sinkhorn algorithm as described by
Cuturi [9]. On the other hand, to handle the maximization problem in (4.8), note that
Danskin’s theorem [10] implies the following result, which we employ in Algorithm 1
to perform gradient descent.
Lemma 4.6. OT,λ·e(η, ν) is differentiable w.r.t λk ∀k = 1, . . . ,K, with
∂OT,λ·e(η, ν)
∂λk
=
∫
ek dpi
∗(λ). (4.9)
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Algorithm 1 COT by gradient descent
1: procedure COT(η, ν, , e, δ)
2: e← any basis of S
3: λ← random position in RK
4: do
5: pi∗ ← Sinkhorn(η, ν, f + λ · e, )
6: λk ← λk + δ
∫
ek dpi
∗
7: while not (stop criterion)
8: output pi∗.
The pseudo-algorithm to calculate the approximation of COT(η, ν) in (4.8) is dis-
played in Algorithm 1.
Sinkhorn(η, ν, f +λ·e, ) is the standard Sinkhorn algorithm to compute OT,λ·e(η, ν)
(see [9]); δ is a chosen gradient descent step; the stop criterion consists in the improve-
ment of the optimal value being less than a fixed threshold.
Algorithm 1 shows the most vanilla version of a gradient descent method that we
can use. Given that we have an explicit expression for the gradient, cf. (4.9), we can
also leverage any other first order optimization algorithm to perform Steps 4 to 7 in the
algorithm, that is, to minimize the function Sinkhorn(η, ν, f +λ ·e, ) in the λ variable.
Indeed, in practice we implemented such an optimization procedure using the SLSQP
method in Python’s Scipy optimization package, feeding the method with the explicit
calculated gradients. Numerical experiments demonstrate that this outperforms, in
terms of efficiency, both the vanilla gradient descent method and alternative zero order
methods.
4.2 A numerical method for dynamic Cournot-Nash equilibria
In this section we provide an algorithm to compute dynamic Cournot-Nash equilibria
in the potential game setting of Section 3.1. Thanks to Theorem 3.4, when the energy
function E is convex, this boils down to solving the variational problem (3.5). That
is, we have an additional optimization step (in ν) w.r.t. the previous section. Here
again, we use Theorem 4.5 to approximate causal transport problems with regular-
ized problems OT,S(η, ν) given in (4.6). For  small enough we obtain a reasonable
approximation.
Lemma 4.7.
inf
ν∈P(YT )
{
COT(η, ν) + E [ν]} = lim
↘0
inf
ν∈P(YT )
sup
S∈S
{
OT,S(η, ν) + E [ν]}. (4.10)
Proof. As in (4.7), but adding E [ν] in each of its terms and then minimizing in ν.
As a matter of fact, in order to deal with the optimization in ν in (3.5), it is
convenient to use the dual formulation of the penalized transport problems (see [21,
Proposition 4.4]):
OT,S(η, ν) = sup
φ∈R|XT |,ψ∈R|YT |
G(ν, φ, ψ, , S),
where
G(ν, φ, ψ, , S) :=
∫
φdη +
∫
ψ dν −  exp
(
φ

)T
exp
(
−f + S

)
exp
(
ψ

)
,
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and the exponential exp(·) is understood component-wise. (To lighten the notation,
we do not stress dependence on η, since this is the type distribution which is fixed.)
From now on we think of  small being fixed, and set
L(ν) := sup
S∈S, φ∈R|XT |,ψ∈R|YT |
G(ν, φ, ψ, , S) + E [ν]. (4.11)
Proposition 4.8. The function L is differentiable, with
lim
r↘0
L(ν + r(µ− ν))− L(ν)
r
=
∫
[ψ∗[ν](y) + V [ν](y)]d(µ− ν)(y). (4.12)
Without loss of generality we may assume that
∑
y ψ
∗[ν](y) + V [ν](y) = 0.
Proof. Note that, for ν fixed, the supremum of G in the variables (S, φ, ψ) is uniquely
attained at some S∗ ∈ S. On the other hand, there is a unique function R such that
(φ∗, ψ∗) are optimal if and only if φ∗(x) + ψ∗(y) = R(x, y). Then, from Danskin’s
theorem [10] and the definition of V , we have
lim
r↘0
L(ν + r(µ− ν))− L(ν)
r
= sup
(S∗,φ∗,ψ∗)
attain (4.11)
∫
[ψ∗(y) + V [ν](y)]d(µ− ν)(y).
Now, if (φ∗, ψ∗) and (φ˜∗, ψ˜∗) are optimizers, then φ∗(x) + ψ∗(y) = R(x, y) = φ˜∗(x) +
ψ˜∗(y), and so ψ∗ = ψ˜∗ + c. This establishes (4.12). The final conclusion follows after
a possible translation of ψ∗[ν] by a constant.
Remark 4.9. Note that ψ∗[ν] is a result of the Sinkhorn algorithm, and this facilitates
the optimization w.r.t. ν. Thanks to the explicit expression of the gradient, we can
search the optimal ν efficiently. This enables us to compute, in a reasonable amount
of time, numerous different cases in the example of next subsection.
Algorithm 2 Dynamic Cournot Nash equilibria
1: procedure Cournot Nash(η, f , , δ, V )
2: initialize ν
3: do
4: pi∗, ψ∗ ← COT(η, ν, f, , δ)
5: ν ← ν − δ(ψ∗ + V [ν])
6: while not (stop criterion)
7: output ν∗
All this leads to Algorithm 2, in which we perform gradient decent at the level
of ν. To wit, Step 5 therein uses (4.12) to perform the descent step. (To be precise,
Step 5 in fact computes first ν˜(y) := {ν(y)− δ(ψ∗(y) + V [ν](y)} ∨ 0 and then outputs
ν˜ normalized so as to be a probability vector.) On the other hand, Step 4 applies
Algorithm 1. The stop criterion consists again in the improvement of the optimal
value being less than a fixed threshold.
Note that the total social cost (3.8) can also be optimized using a simple modifi-
cation of Algorithm 2, where V [ν](= ∇νE(ν)) is replaced by ∇ν(
∫
V [ν](y)ν(dy))(z) =∫ ∇ν(V [ν](y))(z)ν(dy) + V [ν](z).
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5 Examples
5.1 A case study in a toy model
In this section, we apply the numerical scheme developed in the previous section in a
simple two-stage game (T = 2), cf. Example 1.1. We consider a number of messengers
(agents) delivering parcels from s0 to s1 and then from s1 to s2, where s0, s1, s2 are
names of three sites (Fig. 1).
Figure 1: Three sites sequentially connected by two kinds of roads
5.1.1 Path space of types
At the starting site s0, each agent gets a parcel of two possible types:
E. Express type, which is better to be delivered as quickly as possible, otherwise a
penalty will be imposed.
N. Normal type, which can be delivered either quickly or slowly, and no penalty
will be imposed based on that.
After delivering the parcel to s1, each agent gets another parcel to be delivered
from s1 to s2. The parcel can again be of the two types described above. Therefore,
the type space is X := {E,N}, and the path space of types is XT = {E,N}2. In
accordance with the notation introduced in Section 2, we denote by x = (x1, x2) the
random process of types on the path space, that has fixed (and known) distribution
η.
5.1.2 Path space of actions and cost function
For delivering parcels between each pair of sites, the agents have two kinds of roads
between which to choose: Quick road (Q) and Slow road (S). Therefore, the action
space is Y := {Q,S}, and the path space of actions is YT = {Q,S}2. Taking a Slow
road is penalized when delivering a parcel of Express type. Specifically, if a messenger’s
parcel is of Express type and she takes the Slow road, there will be a penalty of 0.5.
Taking the Slow road in the first stage also affects the delivery time of the parcel to be
delivered in the second stage. This results in a cost of 0.25 when taking S in the first
stage while having a parcel E in the second stage. In addition, there is a mean-field
cost that takes into account congestion, and equals the percentage of agents taking
the same road.
The distribution ν of the action process has support on the four points {(Q,Q), (Q,S),
(S,Q), (S, S)}, and we denote the respective probabilities by {ν1, ν2, ν3, ν4}. The cost
just described fits into the separable cost framework (3.2), where the type-action part
f(x, y) is described by the matrix:
Q,Q Q,S S,Q S,S
E,E 0 0.5 0.5 1
E,N 0 0 0.5 0.5
N,E 0 0.5 0.25 0.75
N,N 0 0 0 0
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and the mean-field part of the cost is given by:
V [ν](y) :=(2ν1 + ν2 + ν3)1y=(Q,Q) + (ν1 + 2ν2 + ν4)1y=(Q,S)
+ (ν1 + 2ν3 + ν4)1y=(S,Q) + (ν2 + ν3 + 2ν4)1y=(S,S).
Note that the functional V defined above is the first variation of the energy functional
E : P(YT )→ R given by
E(ν) := ν21 + ν22 + ν23 + ν24 + (ν1 + ν4)(ν2 + ν3). (5.1)
To see this, fix any measure ξ ∈ P(YT ) and let ζ := ξ − ν. The probabilities ζi, i =
1, · · · , 4, are defined coherently with previous notation. Then we have
lim
→0+
E(ν +  ζ)− E(ν)

= ζ1(2ν1 + ν2 + ν3) + ζ2(ν1 + 2ν2 + ν4) + ζ3(ν1 + 2ν3 + ν4) + ζ4(ν2 + ν3 + 2ν4)
= Eζ [V [ν](y)].
5.1.3 Static versus dynamic equilibria
We define the type distribution η via a parameter 0 ≤ p ≤ 1. At the first step we have
η(x1 = E) = η(x1 = N) = 1/2, while the transition probabilities for the second step
are
η(x2 = E|x1 = E) = η(x2 = N|x1 = N) = p
η(x2 = N|x1 = E) = η(x2 = E|x1 = N) = 1− p.
In the two tables below we report agents’ configurations at equilibria (optimal pi’s)
in the two cases:
A. agents know the full type path from the beginning (i.e. static equilibria, as
studied in [7]);
B. agents know the type distribution from the beginning, but the actual paths are
only revealed progressively in time (i.e. dynamic equilibria studied in the present
paper).
We consider several values of p, to illustrate the effect of having full versus non-
anticipative information. Mathematically, this means that the tables in B are calcu-
lated by solving problem (3.5), namely
inf
ν∈P(YT )
{
COT(η, ν) + E [ν]},
whereas those in A are computed by replacing COT with OT, namely
inf
ν∈P(YT )
{
OT(η, ν) + E [ν]}.
A. Static Cournot-Nash equilibria for different values of p.
p=0.1 Q,Q Q,S S,Q S,S
E,E 0.048 0.001 0.000 0.000
E,N 0.073 0.330 0.008 0.038
N,E 0.181 0.006 0.256 0.008
N,N 0.000 0.002 0.009 0.039
p=0.5 Q,Q Q,S S,Q S,S
E,E 0.241 0.007 0.002 0.000
E,N 0.042 0.189 0.003 0.015
N,E 0.122 0.004 0.121 0.004
N,N 0.003 0.016 0.042 0.189
p=0.9 Q,Q Q,S S,Q S,S
E,E 0.435 0.013 0.002 0.000
E,N 0.009 0.039 0.000 0.002
N,E 0.032 0.001 0.017 0.001
N,N 0.011 0.051 0.070 0.318
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B. Dynamic Cournot-Nash equilibria for different values of p.
p=0.1 Q,Q Q,S S,Q S,S
E,E 0.045 0.001 0.004 0.000
E,N 0.075 0.339 0.007 0.030
N,E 0.158 0.005 0.279 0.008
N,N 0.003 0.015 0.006 0.026
p=0.5 Q,Q Q,S S,Q S,S
E,E 0.238 0.007 0.005 0.000
E,N 0.044 0.201 0.001 0.004
N,E 0.061 0.002 0.181 0.006
N,N 0.011 0.052 0.034 0.153
p=0.9 Q,Q Q,S S,Q S,S
E,E 0.435 0.013 0.002 0.000
E,N 0.009 0.041 0.000 0.000
N,E 0.009 0.000 0.040 0.001
N,N 0.015 0.066 0.066 0.302
As expected, knowing future types affects agents’ choice in previous times as well.
To wit, an agent that at the first stage already knows that she will get a parcel E at
the next stage (rows 1 and 3, table A) will have more incentive to take the Q road
in the first stage, as compared to the case where she only knows the current type
(table B). To see this phenomenon more clearly, in Figure 2-l.h.s. we illustrate the
different behaviour of agents of type (E,E) and (N,E) in the static and dynamic case,
as function of the parameter p. Obviously in the two extreme situations p ∈ {0, 1},
the knowledge of the distribution η already reveals the full type path from the outset
of the game, and thus static and dynamic equilibria coincide. The farther we are from
these trivial situations, the more difference of information there is between static and
dynamic case, hence the bigger the difference in the behaviour of agents at equilibrium.
An analogous effect is seen in Figure 2-r.h.s., where we report the (relative) difference
between total cost in the static and dynamic equilibria.
Figure 2: L.h.s.: Change in the probability of agents (E,E) taking Q in the first stage, and
of agents (N,E) taking Q in the first stage, when comparing static and dynamic equilibria.
R.h.s.: Difference of the total cost between static and dynamic equilibria.
Figure 3 reports the probability of taking the Q road at stage 1 in the dynamic
Cournot-Nash equilibria. Note that p = 0 corresponds to the case where all agents
switch parcel type from stage 1 to stage 2, while p = 1 corresponds to the case of
all agents getting in stage 2 the same parcel type they get in stage 1. Clearly, in the
first case all agents have some incentive to take the Q road at stage 1, either because
they have a parcel E at that stage, or because they will have it at the next stage,
since in either case taking the S road would involve a penalty. On the other hand, in
the second case, only half of the agents, the (E,E) type, have such an incentive. This
observation gives the right intuition about the behaviour of agents at equilibrium, as
we see from the monotonicity illustrated in Figure 3.
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Figure 3: Probability of agents taking the Q road in the first stage in dynamic Cournot-
Nash equilibria.
5.1.4 Price of Anarchy
Let the type distribution η be as in Section 5.1.3. Note that, since the functional E in
(5.1) is strictly convex, by Corollary 3.6 the distribution ν∗ of the optimal actions is
unique, and so is the total cost associated to competitive equilibria. The latter equals
TC[ν∗] = COT(η, ν∗) +
∫
V [ν∗]dν∗, and is the numerator of the PoA in (3.9). In
Figure 4 we plot the Price of Anarchy against p. We notice that the smaller p is,
that is, the higher the probability of switching parcel type between stage 1 and 2, the
higher the PoA, thus, the higher the difference between competitive and cooperative
equilibria. The rationale here is that congestion at the first stage increases when p
becomes smaller, since in that case there is a stronger incentive to take the Quick
road.
Figure 4: Price of Anarchy as a function of p.
5.2 On closed-form solutions: The Knothe-Rosenblatt case
We will now consider a class of cost functions in discrete time for which we can charac-
terize the optimal transport problem inside (3.5), and thus mixed-strategy equilibria
too, thanks to Theorem 3.4. We denote by Fµ1 the cumulative distribution of p
1
∗µ
(with p1 projection onto the first coordinate), and by Fµz1,...,zt−1 the cumulative dis-
tribution of the t-marginal of µ given the first t − 1 ones, whenever µ is a measure
in multiple dimensions. The increasing T -dimensional Knothe-Rosenblatt rearrange-
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ment5 of η and ν is defined as the law of the random vector (X∗1 , . . . , X
∗
T , Y
∗
1 , . . . , Y
∗
T )
where
X∗1 = F
−1
η1 (U1), Y
∗
1 = F
−1
ν1 (U1), and inductively (5.2)
X∗t = F
−1
η
X∗1 ,...,X∗t−1
(Ut), Y
∗
t = F
−1
ν
Y ∗1 ,...,Y ∗t−1
(Ut), for t = 2, . . . , T,
for U1, . . . , UT independent and uniformly distributed random variables on [0, 1]. Ad-
ditionally, if η-a.s. all the conditional distributions of η are atomless (e.g. if η has a
density), then this rearrangement is induced by the (Monge) map
(x1, . . . , xT ) 7→ A(x1, . . . , xT ) := (A1(x1), A2(x2;x1), . . . , AT (xT ;x1, . . . .xT−1)),
where A1(x1) := F
−1
ν1 ◦ Fη1(x1) and
At(xt;x1, . . . , xt−1) := F−1
νA
1(x1),...,A
t−1(xt−1;x1,...,xt−2)
◦ Fηx1,...,xt−1 (xt), t ≥ 2.
In the proposition below we use the notation ∆xt = xt−xt−1 and ∆yt = yt−yt−1.
Proposition 5.1. Assume that one of the following conditions is satisfied:
(a) η has independent marginals, and f(x, y) =
∑T
t=1 ft(xt, y1, ..., yt) is such that,
for all y1, ..., yt−1, kt(u, z) := ft(u, y1, ..., yt−1, z) satisfies the Spence-Mirrlees
condition ∂uzkt(u, z) < 0;
(b) η has independent increments, and f(x, y) = f1(x1, y1) +
∑T
t=2 ft(∆xt − ∆yt),
with ft convex.
Then Cournot-Nash equilibria (if they exist) are determined by the second marginal,
and precisely given by the Knothe-Rosenblatt rearrangement. Moreover, if η has a den-
sity, all Cournot-Nash equilibria are in fact pure (and given by the Knothe-Rosenblatt
map).
Proof. Under condition (a) or (b), Theorem 2.7 and Corollary 2.8 in [BBLZ] imply
that, for any ν ∈ P(YT ), the causal transport problem COT(η, ν) admits a unique
solution which is given by the Knothe-Rosenblatt rearrangement, and that if η has
a density, then the unique solution to COT(η, ν) is given by the Knothe-Rosenblatt
map. Theorem 3.4 above concludes.
6 Appendix
6.1 Auxiliary results and profs
Lemma 6.1. Let B ⊆ P(YT ) be a weakly compact set of measures, and η ∈ P(XT )
be given. Then the set Πc(η,B) := ∪ν∈BΠc(η, ν) is weakly compact.
Proof. Call τ and σ the Polish topologies of XT and YT , respectively. Consider
X 3 x1 7→ ηx1(dx2, . . . , dxT ) ∈ P(XT−1)
X2 3 (x1, x2) 7→ ηx1,x2(dx3, . . . , dxT ) ∈ P(XT−2)
...
XT−1 3 (x1, . . . , xT−1) 7→ ηx1,...,xT−1(dxT ) ∈ P(X),
5 The reader might know it by the name quantile transform or Knothe-Rosenblatt coupling.
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for (some) regular conditional distributions of η. We can view the collection of these
T −1 measurable mappings as a measurable function from XT into a Polish space. By
[15, Theorem 13.11], there is a stronger Polish topology on XT , which we call τˆ , whose
Borel sets are the same as for τ , and such that the above mapping is continuous when
the domain space XT is given the τˆ topology. Let us denote by Σ1 the topology on
P(XT ×YT ) generated by convergence w.r.t. τ ×σ-continuous bounded functions, and
Σ2 the topology generated by convergence w.r.t. τˆ ×σ-continuous bounded functions.
By [5, Proposition 2.4] we know that causality can be tested by integration against
functions of the form
h(y1, . . . , yt)
[
g(x1, . . . , xT )−
∫
g(x1, . . . , xt, x¯t+1, . . . , x¯T )η
x1,...,xt(dx¯t+1, . . . , dx¯T )
]
,
for each t, h bounded σ-continuous and g bounded τ -continuous. Notice that the
function in brackets is then by definition also τˆ -continuous, so the overall expression
is τˆ×σ-continuous. It follows that Πc(η,B) is Σ2-closed. On the other hand, Πc(η,B)
is also Σ2-tight, since as a Borel measure η is still tight w.r.t. the stronger topology
induced by τˆ -continuous bounded functions. Thus Πc(η,B) is Σ2-compact and in
particular also Σ1-compact.
Proof of Theorem 4.3. The existence follows from Lemma 6.1, since Πc(η, ν) is weakly
compact, and the functional pi 7→ ∫ fdpi is lower semicontinuous. For the duality, me
may first stregthen the topology on XT , just as we did in the proof of Lemma 6.1, so
guaranteeing that the conditional distributions {ηx1,...,xt}t are continuous. Doing so
shows that each F ∈ F is continuous after strengthening the topology. Similarly, the
proof of [5, Proposition 2.4] reveals that the martingales {Mt}t are determined by the
conditional distributions {ηx1,...,xt}t, and so each S ∈ S can be assumed continuous
after strengthening the topology. Crucially, since η remains a Borel measure after
this strengthening of topology, the set Π(η, ν) is still compact after we accordingly
strengthen the weak topology on P(XT × YT ). This proves that
COT(η, ν) = inf
pi∈Π(η,ν)
sup
S∈S
∫
(f + S)dpi = sup
S∈S
inf
pi∈Π(η,ν)
∫
(f + S)dpi
= inf
pi∈Π(η,ν)
sup
F∈F
∫
(f + F )dpi = sup
F∈F
inf
pi∈Π(η,ν)
∫
(f + F )dpi,
by Proposition 4.1 and a familiar application of Sion’s minimax theorem. The remain-
ing identities are obtained by applying Kantorovich duality (cf. [25]) to infpi∈Π(η,ν)
∫
(f+
S)dpi and infpi∈Π(η,ν)
∫
(f + F )dpi.
Lemma 6.2. If f is lower bounded and lower semicontinuous, then
inf
pi∈Πc(η,ν)
{∫
f dpi − Ent(pi)} = sup
S∈S
OT,S .
Proof. Very similar to the proof of Theorem 4.3, where Sion’s minimax theorem is
invoked. We only have to check that −Ent(·) is convex and lower semicontinuous.
Letting g(x) := x log(x), which is a convex continuous function on [0,∞), this imme-
diately implies that pi 7→ −Ent(pi) = ∑ g(pii,k) is convex and continuous.
6.2 Basis for S
We first get a better understanding of x-adapted and y-adapted processes, as intro-
duced at the beginning of Section 4, in the finite setting of Assumption 4.4, where
|X| = n and |Y| = m. Consider the case where we have three-steps, T = 3, and two
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possible actions, say Y = {a, b}. Then the path space of actions YT can be represented
with the tree in Figure 5.
Figure 5: Tree representation of the path space of actions
We call ‘node’ every box of the tree, and ‘leaf’ any node at the terminal time
T . Now, any y-adapted process can be represented with a tree with same structure,
while having any possible values in the nodes. Clearly, a basis for such processes
can be given by assigning the value 1 to any of the nodes of the tree and 0 to all
other nodes. This means that y-adapted processes can be identified with elements
in R#nodes. In general, for any number of steps T ∈ {2, 3, . . .} and any number of
actions m, y-adapted processes are identified with vectors in R#nodes = RNY , with
NY =
∑T
t=1m
t.
Analogously, we can represent the path space of types XT with a tree, which
defines the structure of all x-adapted processes. Now, to build the set S, we are
only interested in x-adapted processes that are η-martingales. For these processes,
knowing the values at terminal time is enough, since values at previous times are then
determined by backward recursion thanks to the martingale property. A basis for
such processes can therefore be given by assigning 1 to any of the leaves of the tree
representing XT , and 0 to all other leaves. x-adapted η-martingales can therefore be
identified with vectors in R#leaves = RnT .
Finally, S is generated by the finite basis of elements of the form
∑
t<T h
i
t(M
j
t+1−
M jt ), where {hi}NYi=1 is a basis for the y-adapted processes and {M j}n
T
j=1 is a basis
for the x-adapted η-martingales. We denote such a basis for S by {ek}Kk=1, where
K = nT ·NY.
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